![]() ![]() This apparent mind-dependence of artifacts raises distinctive metaphysical suspicions against them because an object is usually assumed to be a genuine part of our world if it possesses a nature which is entirely independent of human concepts, language, practices, etc., and is open to discovery. On the face of it, artifacts are distinguished from natural objects in that they are apparently mind-dependent, at least in the sense that they would not exist were it not for the (mental and physical) activities of humans beings who make and use them. 2 Popper on the reality and (partial) autonomy of artifactsģ The age-old distinction between artifacts and natural objects, the origin of which can be traced back to Aristotle, is often taken as a starting point in the philosophical discussions of artifacts. The first argument focuses on the composition and distinctive features of material artifacts and the second one emphasizes their creative and epistemic aspects. Two arguments are posed to challenge the dual ontological status of what Popper called “embodied” World 3 objects. The second section examines the ontological status of artifacts. In addition, attention is drawn towards how to read his notion of the (partial) autonomy of artifacts. Recent discussions about the longstanding distinction between natural objects 4 and artifacts are brought up and the relevance of Popper’s pluralistic thesis to this debate is pointed out. The first section presents a critical exposition of Popper’s account of reality and (partial) autonomy of artifacts.
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